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Abstract: This paper provides a theoretical sketch of  relationality within the field of  international 
relations (IR). It argues, contrary to what many international relations scholars hold, that representation 
is practice: academic representation reflects the background of  a community of  practice and highlights what 
is embodied therein. Therefore, different cultural communities have different practices and draw from 
different background knowledge. Rationality, which serves as the dominant foundation for background 
knowledge within many Western communities of  practice, permeates through mainstream IR theory. 
Relationality performs a similar role in many traditionally Confucian communities of  practice, where 
relations enjoy a distinct ontological status over individual rationality. A relational theory assumes (1) that 
self-existence coincides with other-existence and coexistence, and (2) that self-interest coincides with other-
interest. Based on these assumptions it argues that relations select, meaning that in a social situation actors 
base their action on relations in the first place and that rationality is and can only be defined and judged 
in terms of  relations. In such a theory, rationality is and can only be defined and judged in terms of  
relations. The article uses the Association of  Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as an example to 




A key source of  Anglophone thinking about International Relations (IR) in relational terms 
has been the broader ‘practice turn’ in social theory (see Adler and Pouliot 2011a, 2011b; 
Bueger and Gadinger 2015; see also Nexon and Jackson in this issue). The ‘practice turn’ 
established practices as ontological priorities; it emphasized the importance of  what a 
community of  practice does in social life (Schatzki 2001). This approach—the 
International Practice Approach (IPA hereafter)—has sought to focus not on units or 
subjects but on the practices that shape or produce them. In this article, we suggest that 
IPA’s dualistic structuring of  ‘background knowledge’ and ‘representational knowledge’ 
limits its potential as a resource for relational theorising despite the claim that IPA bridges 
the background and the representational (Adler and Pouliot 2011, 13-14).  
 
Against this backdrop, we propose a theoretical sketch of  representation as a relational 
practice. Our argument progresses in four sections. The first section outlines IPA’s 
dichotomisation of  background and representational knowledge and argues, in contrast, 
that the two cannot be meaningfully separated. To illustrate this point, we use academic 
communities as an example, suggesting that even academic knowledge relies on 
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(geo)cultural communities of  practice and the background knowledge that both shapes 
them and is shaped by them in turn. The second section outlines how many scholars within 
the Anglophone academic or epistemic community have used rationality to organise their 
ideas. We use what are often called ‘mainstream’ IR theories—neorealism, neoliberalism, 
and constructivism—to illustrate this argument. In contrast, the third section examines 
how the Sinophone academic or epistemic community have used relationality to organise 
their ideas. We use Chinese approaches to IR theorising—specifically, the zhongyong 
dialectic—to illustrate this point. The fourth section further illustrates the prevalence of  
relational thinking within the Sinophone community through the example of  ASEAN as 
a governing body that reflects a regional community of  practice. 
 
To be clear from the outset, we are not advocating a form of  cultural essentialism, strategic 
or otherwise. We do not suggest that rationality is unique to some imagined Western 
community of  practice, nor do we suggest that rationality fully encompasses such an 
imagined community. One may even argue that the background knowledge we ascribe to 
‘mainstream’ IR theories—neorealism, neoliberalism, and constructivism—only 
represents a small community of  predominantly white, male intellectuals. Many post-
colonial and feminist theories, and indeed IPA itself, draw on the same intellectual tradition 
of  this imagined Western community to instead emphasise relationality. Relational thinking, 
based on an equally imagined ‘Confucian’ or ‘Chinese’ tradition, does not fully encompass 
the intellectual tradition of  the ‘Sinophone’ (geo)cultural community either. In fact, many 
Sinophone scholars draw on neorealism, neoliberalism, and constructivism—the same 
theories that foreground rationality. Still, certain terms continue to be dominant or 
hegemonic in a given (geo)cultural tradition without characterizing ‘Western’ and ‘Chinese’ 
thought as monolithic or opposed to one another (cf. Hall and Ames, 1995). The dominant 
narrative of  modernity in the West is represented mainly as individualistic rationality 
(advanced, perhaps, by those same white, male intellectuals who claim to represent the 
Western community). To a large extent, these ‘Western’ academic practitioners have based 
their representations predominantly on modern Western thought. With its embedded 
violence—and despite protests by post-colonial and feminist scholars—modern Western 
thought has dominated much academic discourse both within China and abroad. A survey 
by the Project on Teaching, Research, and International Practice (TRIP), for example, has 
repeatedly shown that IR scholars within the United States have largely continued to view 
IR through the lenses of  realism, liberalism, and constructivism (Sil and Katzenstein 2010, 
24-25; Maliniak et al. 2014). Only a genuinely globalist approach with multiculturalism at 
its core can effectively overcome the dominance of  modern Western thought in academic 
discourse and practice. 
 
Because this article is written as part of  a special issue on relational theorising in 
Anglophone and Sinophone IR, we use a theoretical approach and apply our theory only 
through limited empirical examples. Readers who want to pursue further and applied 





IPA, which has grown in popularity in the last decade, includes several interrelated 
arguments. First, it gives ontological priority to practice. Second, it argues that practice 
rests on ‘background knowledge’, which forms the foundation upon which humans act 
(Searle 1995). In other words, most of  what people do does not derive from conscious 
deliberation or thoughtful reflection, but from background or tacit knowledge (Pouliot 
2008, 258). Many IPA scholars argue that mainstream IR theories of  human action ‘suffer 
from a representational bias in that they focus on what agents think about instead of  what 
they think from’ (Pouliot 2008, 257). Third, IPA demonstrates that background knowledge 
is embodied in a ‘community of  practice’, which is ‘a configuration of  a domain of  
knowledge that constitutes like mindedness, a community of  people that “creates the social 
fabric of  learning,” and a shared practice that embodies “the knowledge the community 
develops, shares, and maintains”’ (Adler and Pouliot 2011, 17). These communities of  
practice are social collectives that both develop and share background knowledge and are, 
in turn, constituted and shaped by such knowledge.  
 
In viewing communities of  practice this way, IPA prioritises the role of  practice in IR 
theorising by shifting background knowledge to the foreground. However, the relational 
thinking that stems from IPA’s dichotomisation of  ‘background knowledge’ and 
‘representational knowledge’—the former referring to the inarticulate and unreflective and 
the latter to the articulate and deliberate—is flawed. While background knowledge does 
play a key role in orienting human activity, it is not an independent alternative to 
representational knowledge. By construing it thus, IPA scholars do not merely present 
background knowledge as the primary base for human action; they reinforce the view that 
there are two types of  knowledge—background and representational—that exist in parallel 
or even in binary opposition. By splitting representation from practice, they, like Descartes, 
also implicitly separate the thinking mind from the doing body. 
 
In contrast, we suggest that background and representational knowledge are not 
alternatives to one another, but rather are inseparable from one another. Knowledge 
production, itself, is a practice that relies on the background knowledge of  a relational 
community of  practice. Consider an academic community: its members come together in 
relationships; deliberate and debate; form rules and norms; and act as practitioners in 
knowledge production and representation. In so doing, they rely on tacit background 
knowledge—assumptions and understandings that are not explicit in representation and 
deliberation, but that are inherent to it. In other words, they are shaped by their deliberative 
and representational practice, whether conscious or unconscious. 
 
At their core, representation and background knowledge are intertwined; they are 
inseparable. The producer of  knowledge is not in isolation but is rather a socially-
constituted person who builds relationships with others and lives intertwined with the 
background knowledge of  a community of  practice. Indeed, a social scholar immersed in 
a certain community of  practice and shaped by the background knowledge thereof  would 
find it near impossible to produce representational knowledge that was absolutely alien to 
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such background knowledge.  
 
These relational communities of  practice are where background knowledge is embodied, 
but IPA defines them in quite a narrow sense. Since practice is defined as ‘competent 
performances’ (Adler and Pouliot 2011, 6), a community of  practice is necessarily more 
functional than fundamental: it is a grouping that works in a specific issue area (e.g. the 
diplomatic community). Such a professional community, including the academic 
community, may indeed share a set of  practices and norms, though these practices and 
norms may be negotiated, evolve, and remain incomplete. We want to suggest, however, 
that scholars cannot ignore the background knowledge associated with a (geo)cultural 
community of  practice (cf. Bourdieu 2012). (Geo)culturally nurtured background 
knowledge is typically—though not necessarily—thicker, steadier, and more spontaneous 
than any professionally and technically formed background knowledge in a certain issue 
area. 
 
Inspired by both the contributions and limitations of  IPA, we propose a (geo)culturally 
grounded view of  relational practice. First, we suggest that relational practice is inseparable 
from background knowledge. Put differently, much of  human activity is oriented 
‘immediately and effortlessly’ by ‘nonintentional or preintentional capacities’ (Searle 1995, 
129, 132). Second, we suggest that representation is practice, so representational 
knowledge must therefore be inseparable from background knowledge. Even though 
background knowledge can never be fully represented by representational knowledge 
(Schatzki 2001, 8-9), the latter does still represent the former, albeit only partially. Third, 
we suggest that background knowledge is embodied in a community of  relational practice, 
where (geo)cultural communities are key. In other words, relational community of  practice 
should not be limited to technically defined communities. Fourth, we suggest that any 
social theory, viewed as a form of  representational knowledge, is necessarily entwined with 
the background knowledge of  the (geo)cultural community or communities of  practice 
through which it emerged. In what follows, we use debates around ‘rationality’ and 




If  representation is practice and scholars are practitioners, representational knowledge 
produced by scholars reflects the background knowledge of  the (geo)cultural community 
in which it is produced. Under this view, IR theory—a form of  representational 
knowledge—is also a practice. Balance-of-power theory, for example, relies on the practice 
of  European international relations; no such theory could have grown out of  the East 
Asian tribute system or the Tokugawa international system (Kang 2007; Ringmar 2012). 
Further, the logics of  action represented by mainstream IR theories like neorealism, 
neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism (Waltz 1979; Keohane 1984; Wendt 1999) 
all contain and represent a core concept—individualistic rationality—which rests solidly 
on the background knowledge of  the so-called Western cultural communities these 
theories have been taken to represent.  
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The logics of  consequences and appropriateness that form the core of  rationalistic and 
reflective IR theories are based on rationality. The former reflects the rational choice 
proposition, arguing that human actors ‘choose among alternatives by evaluating their 
likely consequences for personal and collective objectives’ (March and Olsen 1998, 949). 
It assumes that actors are instrumentally rational with prior preferences and well-defined 
self-interests. These actors are capable of  comparing and calculating policy alternatives and 
choose the one that maximizes their interests. Olsen (1995) suggests a logic of  collective 
action that falls within the logic of  consequences: every actor in a collective-action situation 
is instrumentally rational, self-interested, and ready to free ride whenever possible. In IR, 
structural realism and neo-liberal institutionalism are typical examples of  this logic as well: 
the crucial mechanism by which international structures and international institutions 
influence an actor’s behaviour is the actor’s instrumental rationality. Only through 
rationality do the structure of  power distribution and international institutions impact 
actor behaviour. In other words, instrumental rationality is the key for what Keohane (1989) 
terms the ‘rationalistic approach’.  
 
Constructivism offers an alternative argument: the logic of  appropriateness drives action. 
Appropriateness is the sense of  doing the right thing or following the right social norms 
in a particular situation. Rules and norms, which can both constitute an actor’s identity and 
regulate an actor’s behaviour, are crucial to this logic (Ruggie 1999). They support both the 
rationalistic emphasis on behaviour and the constructivist exploration of  identity. To date, 
the logic of  appropriateness has mainly focused on norm-guided behaviours—from norm 
acceptance to norm internalization and then to norm following—using what Hopf  terms 
‘value rationality’, which ‘implies reference to some norms when making a choice’ (2010, 
540). Similarly, Finnemore (1996) emphasises how international organisations teach actors 
good norms: the mechanism of  teaching enables alleged newcomers in international 
society to understand what their interests should be and what behaviour is appropriate. In 
fact, individualistic rationality applies throughout the process of  both norm learning and 
following: following the norms taught by international organisations is beneficial to actors 
and subsequently leads them to accept the norms. Risse (2000, 4) describes this logic of  
appropriateness as ‘normative rationality’. While instrumental rationality suggests that 
actors act according to their calculation of  gains measured against their fixed interests, 
normative rationality suggests that human action is rational if  and only if  it follows the 
right norms.  
 
The logic of  arguing, to a large extent, mirrors the logic of  appropriateness; it also 
emphasises ‘better’ rules and norms. Drawing on Habermas’ communicative action theory, 
which stresses the importance of  argumentative rationality, it holds that ‘human actors 
engage in truth seeking with the aim of  reaching a mutual understanding based on a 
reasoned consensus … challenging the validity claims involved in any communication’ 
(Risse 2000, 1-2). In other words, actors know there are norms and wish to follow good 
norms, but must argue in order to know which norms are good and reasonable. Thus, one 
might say, ‘let’s argue’, find nice norms through arguing, and then follow them. 
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Fundamentally, the logic of  arguing is a form of  normative rationality that emphasises 
argumentation as an effective way to choose good norms (Kornprobst 2007). This logic is 
particularly significant in the normative suasion stage of  norm socialisation proposed by 
Checkel (2005), during which social actors follow rules and norms, but do not follow them 
blindly. The logic involves ‘a reflexive process whereby agents need to figure out what 
behaviour is appropriate to a situation’ (Pouliot 2008, 262). Argumentative rationality seeks 
to guide individual behaviour via good norms, thus making normative rationality even 
more rational. 
 
Rationality constitutes the basis for all three of  these theories, and their associated logics, 
which differ only in what kind of  rationality they use. Neorealism and neoliberal 
institutionalism use instrumental rationality. Mainstream constructivism uses normative 
rationality. And no matter if  the international structure is material or ideational, it 
influences actors’ behaviour through individualistic rationality. The logic of  arguing, too, 
reinforces normative rationality. Thus, these mainstream IR theories are based on the 
rationality of  individual actors in the international system. In fact, these theories have 
typically emphasised ‘rationality’ to such a degree that it has become essential in the 
representational knowledge of  ‘mainstream’ IR theories, with roots in the imagined ‘West’. 
In Western communities of  practice, for example, the individual has always been the pivot 
in practice. Individual, ‘rational’ action is central to the background knowledge of  such 
communities of  practice; it is embodied in practice and represented in theory. It is 





Confucian communities of  practice have tended to view the world as one of  relations 
rather than atomistic entities, and the social world as one of  human relations rather than 
discrete individuals (Liang 1949/2011; Hall and Ames 1987). As a result, relationality is a 
most significant concept abstracted from the cultural and social practices centred around 
relations and becomes to a large extent a most important element of  the background 
knowledge of  Confucian cultural communities of  practice. The relational theory that we 
have proposed herein and elsewhere holds that, to understand social phenomena and 
meaningful human actions, one must understand relationality (redacted for anonymisation). 
Relationality is to ‘Confucian’ communities of  practice as rationality is to the imagined 
‘Western’ communities of  practice discussed above; for both have been abstracted and 
represented from and through practice in their respective cultural communities.  
  
Relationality is informed by elements embodied in the practical knowledge of  Confucian 
communities. The first of  these elements is co-existence, which states that self-existence 
is simultaneously co-existence with others. In other words, any individual self  is a 
continuous process between the self  and others to whom the self  is related. Co-existence 
contrasts with two ontological positions: one stresses the priority of  self-existence over 
co-existence, which provides the ontological foundation for individualistic rationality (and 
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thus for much of  the mainstream IR literature), and the other posits that co-existence 
comes before self-existence (explicitly in Zhao, 2009; implicitly in Jackson & Nexon, 1999). 
In the Chinese zhongyong dialectics, ‘self ’ and ‘other’ are dependent on each other for their 
existence—or, perhaps better, their becoming (Ling 2013, 2014; Qin, 2016, 2018; Nordin 
and Smith, 2018). Under this view, humans are more relational ‘becomings’ than self-
organizing beings in a social setting. It can be argued that this implies that the well-related 
are fitter to survive and the ‘harmoniously’-related more likely to prosper—even to the 
detriment of  others (Nordin, 2016). 
 
For co-existence to be the normal state of  society, actors must have ‘relational identities’. 
Identities of  social actors are shaped by social relations and formed in the process of  
relating and being related. No absolute and independent identity of  the self  exists (Tu 1985, 
114). Rather, it is constructed and reconstructed in relations with others. In this line of  
thinking, ‘[t]here is no me in isolation, to be considered abstractly: I am the totality of  roles 
I live in relation to specific other’ (Nisbett 2003, 5). In other words, the self  is a ‘relational 
self’ or a ‘self-in-relation-with others’ (Ho 1995, 117, emphasis in original). As the Chinese 
game weiqi or go shows, a piece has no role or identity until it is placed on the chessboard 
and becomes related to other pieces already there. The Chinese language tells a similar 
story: there are no nominative and objective cases for a pronoun. The same Chinese 
character is used for both ‘I’ and ‘me’, or for ‘he’ and ‘him’. Whether it is the nominative 
or the objective depends on its relations to other characters in a sentence. In this way, 
‘China’ or a ‘Confucian community of  practice’ only gains significance through its relation 
to other communities of  practice, such as ‘the West’ or a ‘Western community of  practice’ 
(and vice versa). Both communities of  practice are products or effects of  the international 
relations between them and with others, as is the very ‘international’ through which they 
relate. 
 
In such a situation of  relational identities, shared interest arguably becomes a habitual way 
of  thinking. If  self-existence is simultaneously co-existence and the identity of  the self  is 
formed in relation to others, self-interest is simply impossible to independently define in a 
social context. It is therefore necessary to challenge the primacy of  an independent self-
interest within mainstream IR theories. In a relational community of  practice, interest is 
always shared and realized through reciprocity. Relationality recognizes the legitimacy of  
self-interest, but argues that self-interest and other-interest are shared in social life and can 
be defined only in relational terms. Even interest between deadly enemies is shared. For 
example, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. continued strategic arms negotiations during the Cold War, 
and, during the First World War soldiers of  enemy states deliberately withheld fire during 
trench warfare (Axelrod 1984, 73-87).  
 
The above are conspicuous elements in an arguably Confucian community of  practice and 
indicate that relations are a pivotal factor in social space. This community of  practice relies 
on the logic of  relationality, in which social actors base their actions on relations. In other 
words, an actor makes judgments and decisions according to his or her relationships to 
specific—and often significant—others and the relational context in which these 
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relationships are embedded. In any social setting, what action an actor is to take depends 
very much on their relationships with significant others and their relations with the 
relational context in which they are embedded. In short, relations select.  
 
To apply relationality to real-world examples, we must first clarify a key concept within the 
logic of  Confucian relationality: the relational circle. The self ’s relational circles are its 
relationships, starting from the self, who perceives itself  at the centre of  numerous, 
concentric, relational circles that indicate the self ’s relationships with others. With the self  
as the origin, these relational circles extend outward and throughout the self ’s social world 
(Fei 2012). Through its relational circles, the self  connects itself  to others. The circles 
constitute the social fabrics where the self  is entangled; their social activities occur in, with 
and through these relational circles.  
 
With this concept in mind, relations select through certain crucial mechanisms, most 
importantly what may be called the ‘intimacy rule’, but also mechanisms relating to 
importance and instrumentality. The intimacy rule hypothesises that the more intimate the 
relational circle is, the more it influences your decision (Hwang 1987, 2000). The self ’s 
relational circles indicate the degree of  intimacy of  its relationships with others and 
constitute its sphere of  activity. Those within the innermost ring are the self ’s most 
intimate others, and the degree of  intimacy decreases as the circles move farther away from 
the centre. Under this view, the most intimate circle of  a person is their family (for a 
discussion of  such relationality in the IR context, see Zhang Feng, 2015). 
 
In what follows, we elaborate on this notion of  relationality through the example of  the 
Association of  Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).  
 
ASEAN as an empirical example of  relationality 
 
ASEAN is a good example of how this relational theory, drawing inspiration from what 
has been called a Confucian cultural community, can help us see the logic of relationality 
in empirical practice. In contrast to theorists like Samuel Huntington, who (in)famously 
portrayed civilizational others as diametrically opposed and ‘unassimilatable’ (Huntington 
1996), the relational zhongyong approach from the Confucian community of practice views 
any two interacting cultures and civilizations as mutually inclusive, each containing 
elements of the other even though they differ and may seem to be opposite to one 
another. The inclusive regionalism proposed by ASEAN is an empirical example of this 
zhongyong approach whereby the self and others are complementary in diversity and co-
constitutive (Qin 2016, 40). 
 
We may also use the lens of  relational circles to view ASEAN as an example in IR. Its 
relations include at least three interrelated concentric circles. The first and core circle is 
ASEAN, which consists of  ten member states; the second circle includes neighbouring 
countries or ASEAN’s dialogue partners—initially countries like China, Japan, and South 
Korea, but gradually extending to include more actors like India, Australia, New Zealand, 
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Russia, and the United States; and the third circle may involve any other actors in the world. 
ASEAN tends to consider its relationships with actors in all of  its relational circles before 
it makes a decision, but the priority is always given to maintaining a cohesive and strong 
relationship among the members of  the core circle. In other words, ASEAN’s choice of  
action is first of  all influenced by its most intimate relational circle.  
 
Although intimacy is a key indicator of  relational importance, intimacy does not 
automatically mean that a relationship is important. Another dimension is needed— 
‘importance’—which can interfere with intimacy when an actor considers relationships 
before acting. Typically, the more important your relational partner is, the more your 
relationship with them influences your decision. While ASEAN usually prioritises 
relationships with its most intimate core circle when making decisions, its relationships to 
actors outside of  its core circle also vary in importance. For example, the powerful role 
that the U.S. holds in the region and its significance to ASEAN’s security relations with 
non-ASEAN neighbours like China does not necessarily indicate intimacy with ASEAN 
countries. Nonetheless, ASEAN may prioritise U.S. needs and demands when making 
decisions simply because of  the importance of  the U.S.’s role in the region. Through the 
lens of  zhongyong, cooperation within and across relational circles is a process of co-
changing and co-evolution that is often achieved by maintaining, managing, and 
harmonising relations among actors. Further, zhongyong justifies prioritising the 
maintenance of the cooperation process as an end in itself—one that is more important 
than achieving immediate and tangible results. The ‘comfort-level’ norm among ASEAN 
member exemplifies this prioritisation of cooperation: any action should proceed at a level 
that all members are comfortable with. The norm keeps negotiations from breaking down 
even when serious differences occur (Qin 2016, 37). ASEAN has also developed several 
practices for creating a sense of  shared background knowledge and comfort that enables 
the cooperation process to continue. In the traditional language of  Confucian ethics, these 
practices are called li, typically translated as ‘protocols’ or ‘rites’. Confucian ethics advocate 
these protocols as a way to educate actors and instil shared and appropriate ‘background 
knowledge’ within officials and scholars that are members of  a given community of  
practice. More broadly, instilling actors with li is said to be the civilization-wide process 
behind the formation of  complex and ordered societies, which according to many 
Confucians helps produce good, appropriate, stable, and harmonious relations throughout 
the social body.2 
 
Another mechanism through which relations select is ‘relational rationality’: whether an 
actor’s action is rational depends on how he or she is related to the specific other toward 
whom the action is taken. The logic of  relationality does not negate the proposition that a 
social actor can be rational, but argues that an actor’s individualistic rationality is necessarily 
mediated by his or her relationships with others. Before the self  understands the nature of  
an evolving relationship between itself  and a specific other, its sense of  what actions are 
                                                             
2 We thank an anonymous reviewer for the suggestion to highlight this broader civilizational significance. We also 
point out that this societal harmonisation has been critiqued by students of  this Confucian tradition (e.g. Nordin, 
2016). 
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rational or irrational is particularly limited. Rational actions are typically viewed as those 
serving one’s self-interest, but self-interest is shared, defined, and gained through social 
relations. Thus, rationality is meaningful only when it is defined in terms of  relationality. 
Compared with rationality, therefore, relationality enjoys ontological priority. 
 
The proposition that rationality is relational applies to instrumental rationality as well. The 
idea that people seek to maximise their self-interest has become a widely accepted principle 
of  instrumental rationality. Under a theory of  relationality, however, the self-interest 
assumed by the rational choice model may not be rationally constructed because it doesn’t 
consider what kind of  relationship the self  has with the specific other. Consider the 
classical Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game in which each prisoner has his or her own interest 
and thinks about how most rationally he or she can realize his or her interest in a strategic 
interaction with the other prisoner. Paraphrasing Schelling (1980, 84), we should not expect 
the rational strategies pursued by two individual players in a situation of  pure conflict to 
reveal what kind of  behaviour they might pursue in a relational world (i.e. one where 
relations matter). From the very beginning of  the PD interaction, relational rationality 
differs in that the players know their interest—and thus ‘rationality’ more broadly—is 
defined and achieved in terms of  relations. Defection is rational in a single-move PD game 
but irrational when the players have known each other and expect to play the game 
repeatedly in the future. Because they are no longer strangers and have begun to build 
relations, their rational choices change. Thus, Pouliot argues, ‘while it makes sense for a 
Westerner to be instrumentally rational when planning investment in the economic field, 
it is quite nonsensical (and socially reprehensible) to constantly calculate means and ends 
with family and friends’ (Pouliot 2008, 276). In this sense, the nature of  relationships 
informs what is instrumentally rational and what is not. Further, we can extend this logic 
to some of  our examples of  relational circles above. For example, ASEAN will behave 
differently in relation to other members of  the ASEAN ‘family’ compared to, say, Australia 
or Iceland.  
 
Normative rationality is also relational. Without clearly perceiving the nature of  a 
relationship, the actor does not know what and whose norms he or she should follow when 
making decisions. The nature of  the relationship defines the appropriateness of  an action. 
In Confucianism, ren is the most important moral and social norm—something that recent 
IR theorising has recognized as well (Qin, 2018, Song, 2001). While ren is often translated 
as ‘humaneness’, ‘benevolence’, or ‘virtue’, no single English translation encapsulates its 
real meaning. Instead, ren is expressed in different forms for different relationships. For 
instance, the parent-child relationship dictates that the son should follow the norm of  
family reverence. The friend-friend relationship stipulates that friends should follow the 
norm of  sincerity (for further elaboration on friendship as a relational ontology, see 
Nordin and Smith, 2018). Filial piety in the former and sincerity in the latter are both 
expressions of  the moral norm of  ‘ren’. As Hwang argues, ‘an individual will employ 
different rules of  social exchange to interact with people of  different types of  relationships 
or different degrees of  intimacy’ (Hwang 1987, 949). Fei also holds that, in a Confucian 
society, ‘general standards have no utility. The first thing to do is to understand the specific 
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context: Who is the important figure, and what kind of  relationship is appropriate with 
that figure? Only then can one decide the ethical standards to be applied in that context’ 
(Fei 2012, 68). At a normative level, we can also view ren through ASEAN’s relational 
circles. Not only is it rational for ASEAN countries to behave differently in relation to 
other members of  the ASEAN ‘family’ than they do towards Australia or Iceland, but it’s 
also ethically appropriate within the bounds of  ren for ASEAN member-states to treat 
other member differently than non-members due to their different types of  relations, levels 
of  intimacy, and degrees of  importance. 
 
Even though the logic of  relationality is representational knowledge, it has both grown out 
of  and represents the background knowledge of  Confucian communities of  practice. In 
these communities of  thought, people think primarily about, from, and in terms of  
relations. Not all decisions that ASEAN member-states make are determined by 
relationality, but relationality does influence decision-making in many Confucian 
communities of  practice. Many scholars who are connected to Confucian communities of  
practice are also more attuned to recognise these tendencies—even if  they do not originate 
from or practice within these communities. 
 
Of  course, ASEAN is only one empirical example of  relational circles. China’s partnership 
diplomacy, with more than 80 countries and regional organisations in the world that form 
‘circles of  partners’, is another. These partnership relations break down into four circles 
ranked from most to least intimate: comprehensive strategic partners, strategic partners, 
comprehensive cooperative partners, and partners. China may adopt certain behaviours in 
relation to its ‘comprehensive strategic partners’ (such as the E.U., for example) that it 
would not adopt in relation to less intimate relations like simple ‘partners’. However, it is 
not always clear what these relationships actually signify or what their effect might be in 
any given interaction. The prioritising role of  ‘importance’ could likewise be illustrated by 
the Cold War years, when the U.S. viewed the Soviet Union as its most important bilateral 
relationship, even though the actors’ degree of  intimacy was negative. Further, the U.S. 
decision to establish diplomatic relations with mainland China and sever its official 
relations with Taiwan in the 1970s indicates that it considered its relationship with the 
mainland as more important than its relationship with Taiwan (although the time delay and 
heated debate before the U.S. made its decision suggests that actors may feel conflicted 





Representational and background knowledge are intertwined in communities of  practice. 
They shape and adapt the theories developed within their communities. It is no accident 
that individualistic rationality constitutes a theoretical hard core for mainstream Western 
IR theories as well as for social theories in other disciplines, for the logic of  rationality has 
been deeply embodied in the practice of  Western communities and recurrently refined and 
represented by mainstream knowledge producers into an intellectual core that sustains and 
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dominates much of  the discourse of  the social sciences from economics to political science. 
Throughout this process, representational and background knowledge complement and 
reinforce each other through knowledge practice and production. 
 
Scholars of  Confucian cultural communities of  practice have rarely represented 
individualistic rationality as core in their academic pursuit. For millennia, scholars in 
Confucian communities preferred to focus instead on relations among all under heaven, 
but especially human relations in the social world. It is relationality that has been the topic 
for extensive discussion and sophisticated analysis in classical works of  intellectual 
significance. It is no accident either, for a Confucian society is often said to be a ‘relational 
society’ where ‘human relations’ characterize practice. 
 
It is important to note that the emphasis on relations is by no means a negation of  
rationality. The logic of  relationality recognizes the important role played by rationality, 
but accentuates that rationality is significant only when defined in terms of  relationality, 
or ‘relational rationality’. It means that whether an actor’s action is rational depends on 
how she is related to the specific other toward whom the action is taken. The logic of  
relationality does not negate the proposition that a becoming social actor can be rational, 
instrumentally or normatively, but argues that her individualistic rationality is necessarily 
mediated by her relationships with others in the first place. Rationality is thus defined in 
terms of  relationality. Before the self  is clear about the nature of  an evolving relationship 
between herself  and the specific other, her sense of  what actions are rational or irrational 
is particularly limited. It is generally understood that rationality is about serving one’s 
self-interest, but self-interest is shared, defined and gained through social relations. Thus, 
rationality is meaningful only when it is defined in terms of  relationality. Compared with 
rationality, therefore, relationality arguably enjoys ontological priority. 
 
Background knowledge is intertwined with disparate communities of  practice and shapes 
ways of  thinking and doing representational knowledge. The latter in turn represents, 
reinforces and rationalizes the former as well as the practice in which it is embodied. One 
possible implication for social theory, therefore, is that a certain level of  bounded 
universality is achievable, while perfect validity across time and space is utopian. It does 
not mean, however, that a social theory cannot go beyond its native origins. Rationality has 
been widely accepted as a core concept for social studies far beyond the West, and 
relationality, though a very much underexplored concept, has great potential. After all, to 
relate is human. Moreover, rationality and relationality are not dichotomous oppositions; 
rather they are inclusive of  each other. The simultaneity of  self-existence and coexistence 
entails that individualistic rationality is important, but it is not important on its own. Only 
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